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Paul Joel
THE NEW MOVEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW
Joel R. Paul'
One of the insights of the science of complex systems' is that appar-
ently random events-the formation of clouds, the shape of crystals, the
clustering of automobiles on a freeway--can be understood as conform-
ing to certain patterns.2 These patterns are sensitive to certain initial
conditions. For example, a release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere
may affect the global environment a century later. Therefore, the pat-
terns are easily disturbed and do not repeat themselves. What once
appeared as unpredictable as the movement of a bubble in a glass of
champagne can be described by non-linear equations Theory has dis-
tilled order from chaos.
Scientists observing the patterns generated by non-linear equations in
certain instances, such as the motion of a satellite in space, speculate
that some unknown natural principles "attract" complex systems into
relatively stable states.4 These "strange attractors" may govern the inci-
* © Joel R. Paul. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Connecticut; Profes-
sor of Law, The American University. The author thanks David Kennedy, Peter
Moxhay, Jane and Jim Shulman, and Elizabeth Spahn for their comments and contri-
butions, Theresa Swinehart for her research and editing, and The American University
for its support.
1. Complex systems include both chaos and simple elements. Chaos is any
sequence of events that is not repetitive or predictable, but which may nevertheless
conform to general behavioral patterns. Simple elements are predictable. An example
of a complex system is the movement of leaves on a river. Where the water is tran-
quil or slow moving, the trajectory of the leaves is predictable or "simple:' Where
the river flows through rapids, the movement is unpredictable or "chaotic." ROGER
LEwIN, CoMPLExr: Lu-E AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS 14-16 (1983) (introducing the
inclusion of all disciplines in complex adaptive systems) [hereinafter Co.iPExrrY].
See generally ANASTAsios A. TsoNtS, CHAOS: FROM THEORY TO APPLICATION (1992).
2. CO mPExrY, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that "complex adaptive systems are
pattern seekers").
3. A non-linear equation is an equation with more than one variable that gener-
ates an unpredictable series of points on a graph.
4. JAiEs GLEicK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW ScIENcE 134 (1987).
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dence of some sets of apparently random events. In this view, there is a
comforting underpinning of order that regulates what merely masquer-
ades as confusion.
Postmodern social theory suggests an alternative view: that confusion
may be the underpinning that masquerades as order. In this skeptical
view, it may be that the appearance of order is a function of how we
observe these events.' Indeed, we may find that there is some quality
inherent in our capacity for observation that causes us to "order" cha-
os.6 Understanding multiple points of observation then would enable us
to order chaos differently.'
Imagine how a young child observes the sporadic ebb and flow of
people and freight entering and leaving the terminal of an international
airport. The economist observing the same scene could describe the
inflow and outflow of passengers in terms of the balance of services or
the unloading of air cargo as reflecting the rise and fall of exchange
rates. The trade lawyer would view increased air traffic as a manifesta-
tion of the removal of the lifting of tariff and non-tariff barriers to
5. For example, our ability to find a pattern to which weather may conform is
a function both of the sophistication of our computers and of the variables (tempera-
ture, wind, barometric pressure, humidity, etc.) that we select to input.
6. One explanation for this quality may be the nature of human cognition. Ac-
cording to theories of cognition, when an individual is flooded with conflicting infor-
mation, the individual will seek to impose an internal order on this information in
order to be able to adapt to it. The internally perceived order is not necessarily con-
sistent with the conflicting reality. See DANIEL KATZ AND ROBERT L. KAHN, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1966). One familiar example of that phe-
nomenon may be cognitive dissonance. The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests
that an individual will respond negatively to conflicting information in part by at-
tempting to avoid information that is inconsistent with the individual's own perception
of order. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957); PETER H. LINDSAY AND DONALD A. NORMAN, HUMAN INFORMATION PRO-
CESSING: AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY (1972).
7. My point here is consistent with the need to emphasize the relational or ten-
tative nature of such assumptions. See MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMI-
NISM 10-11 (1992) (noting that postmodern and feminist theory share a concern with
the multiplicity of experience and a concomitant rejection of an essentialist perspective
on human nature). While recognizing the need to generalize experience or categorize
groups, postmodern and feminist scholars have attempted to de-stabilize our as-
sumptions about categories like gender, race and sexuality. See, e.g., Angela Harris,
Race & Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 586 (1990)
(noting the long apparent need for "multiple consciousness in feminist movement");
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 1, 11 (1990) (discussing how law
"could and does treat differences and boundaries between people.").
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trade. The economist's observation overlooks the state's role in con-
structing the market for air travel and regulating imports and exports of
goods and services. The lawyer's perspective does not capture the cul-
tural disorientation and anxiety that characterizes international air travel
for moit of us, as for the uninitiated child. We order social phenome-
non through our interpretation, and there is no single "true" modality of
interpretation that can completely reproduce what we experience.
The recent outpouring of scholarship known as the "new movements"
in international law has included a broad and varied effort to
reconceptualize international economic regulation on multiple fronts.
There is no single ideology or methodology that unifies these move-
ments. Rather, the new movements are characterized by pluralistic poli-
tics and eclectic approaches. The challenge in introducing this impres-
sive collection of essays reconceiving international economic law is to
identify some common themes while respecting the individuality of these
authors.
David Kennedy has described a "new stream of international legal
scholarship."' This movement represents a new generation of scholars
coming of age in the last decade shaped by the collapse of bipolar
politics, the emergence of postcolonialism, the resurgence of market ide-
ology and the challenges posed to state regulation by accelerating trans-
border flows of goods, services, capital and culture. As politics, econom-
ics and technology transform international society, we would expect
accompanying transformations in our legal theory and scholarship de-
scribing the world economy. The new movement is a reaction to the
traditional canons of international economic law influenced by the histor-
ical experiences of this new generation of legal scholars.
The traditions of international economic law trace back to the law
merchant and the organization of a set of principles for resolving juris-
8. Once observing people rushing to and from the airport, David Kennedy re-
marked on the extraordinary coincidence that so many strangers had woken up in the
wrong city.
9. In its broadest sense, international economic law includes all national and
international legal norms that affect transnational movements of goods, services, capital
and labor. The field may include subjects like international business transactions,
private international law, international trade law, immigration law, European Communi-
ties law, comparative law, transnational litigation, international arbitration procedure,
and aspects of banking, competition, employment, environmental, intellectual property.
securities, tax, and telecommunications laws that regulate transnational transactions.
10. David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law, Scholarship, 7 Wis.
INT'L L. J. 1 (1988).
1995] 609
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dictional conflicts. In Anglo-American law, Justice Joseph Story pub-
lished the first significant treatise on the subject of conflicts in 1834."
Story's Commentaries represented a bold innovation drawing on volumi-
nous continental scholarship. Justice Story coined the term, "private
international law," to describe the principles governing conflicts which
he derived from the law of nations. By relying on international law as
the foundation for conflicts rules, Story sought to universalize its effects.
His most enduring contribution was the principle of international comity
which he borrowed from the Dutch jurists of the seventeenth century."2
For Story, comity was the key to resolving the conflict between free and
slave states. 3 It left to the discretion of the courts of free states wheth-
er to enforce the property rights of slaveholders. Several of the key
cases in the field of conflicts arose in connection with this question. 4
The courts' discomfort in denying property rights on the one hand or
justifying the brutality of slavery on the other, shaped the development
of conflicts rules.
Story conceived private international law as a subject of international
law. This unity of public and private international law laid the founda-
tion for a claim of universality. The unity of private and public interna-
tional law, however, was short-lived. In the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the rise of industry was facilitated by the separation of public
and private law. 5 The isolation of private international law meant that
any pretense of universality was lost. 6 Private international law was
11. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
12. These included Paul and John Voet, Christian Rodenburg and Ulrich Huber.
See generally Ernest Lorenzen, Huber's De Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REv. 375
(1919); Hessel Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J.
COMP. L. 297 (1953).
13. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 372 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772) (holding that an
American slaveholder had no right to enforce his property interest against the public
policy of England); The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825) (holding that a U.S. court
would enforce a Spanish slave trader's property interest, even though the law of the
United States prohibited slave trade); La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1822) (J. Story., holding that the slave trade violated the law of nations).
15. See Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1423, 1424 (1982) (noting how the public/private distinction was brought
into the core of legal discussion by the evolution of the market as a central legitimat-
ing institution).
16. See Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WISC. INT'L
LJ. 149, 161-163 (1988) [hereinafter Isolation of Private International Law] (discuss-
ing the fact that the increasing role of private international law contributed to its iso-
[VOL. 10:2
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subsumed under municipal law and became known in the United States
as conflicts of law. Story's influence on the continent continued for a
time through the teachings of Savigny," but efforts at universalizing
private international law repeatedly failed. 8 Since at least the beginning
of this century, U.S. courts sought to accommodate foreign sovereigns
out of comity often by limiting U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe or adju-
dicate, even where significant public policies were implicated. 9 Comity
allowed courts deciding whether to honor a foreign choice of law or
forum selection provision to shift from the rhetoric of contract-protect-
ing the expectations of private parties to a transaction--to the rhetoric of
sovereignty-respecting the foreign law and foreign courts. This strategic
maneuver also had the effect of legitimating efforts by private parties to
opt out of domestic economic regulation. The globalization of production
lation from public international law).
17. See Gerhard Kegel, Story and Savigny, 37 AM J. CoMtp. L 39 (1989) (dis-
cussing the works of Story and Savigny and their impact on private international
law); FRIEDRICH VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CoNLIcT OF LAWS 43044 (W.
Guthrie trans. 1869, 2d rev. ed. 1980).
18. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INT'L L REv. I,
25-26 (1991) [hereinafter Comity] (addressing the separation of public and private
international law in the United States at the turn of the century).
19. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). (holding that "Comity in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand nor of mere courte-
sy and good will upon the other."); see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that complaints premised on foreign conduct "alleges no
case under the [Sherman Act]); cf Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting United States courts have
broken with the "settled law" of comity and found extraterritorial jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act, but there is no consensus on how far to extend it.); see also
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (concluding that
international comity required the court to enforce an international contractual agree-
ment, regarding arbitration, even though the court would be likely to not do so in a
domestic context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (declining juris-
diction and accepting the party's forum-selection clause in the interest of continued
development of international commerce despite the public policy against respecting
these contract provisions); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1. 9 (1971)
(rejecting the "parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts" and finding the party's forum-selection clause controlling);
Bourselan v. Aramco, 498 U.S. 808 (1990) (holding that the federal law barring em-
ployment discrimination is presumptively territorial and does not prohibit a U.S. com-
pany from discriminating against a U.S. national in its foreign office). Cf Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. CA., 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993) (holding that international comity
does not preclude application of the Sherman Act to foreign reinsurance companies'
conduct outside U.S. territory).
1995]
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and the capital markets was facilitated by the rhetoric of comity, which
often masked the underlying political conflicts between the public poli-
cies of the forum state and the foreign state."0
Since the postwar period began, there has been steady progress toward
reconceptualization of the field. Philip Jessup sought to reimagine inter-
national law as involving more than the relationships of one state or
nation with another. He envisioned a "transnational law" that embodied
"all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national fron-
tiers."' Legal scholars like Milton Katz, Kingman Brewster,2 Detlev
Vagts, Henry Steiner, 3 and John Jackson24 sought to redefine the field
by integrating public and private, municipal and international law in
their casebooks, which became highly influential in the field. Professor
Jackson's work focused on law, regulation and policy governing imports
and exports at the international and national levels rather than interests
of private parties to the export transaction. While these postwar scholars
gave greater emphasis to the connections between transnational transac-
tions and public policy, the public/private dichotomy persisted in interna-
tional law to a greater extent than it exists today in municipal law.'
The boundaries of public and private international law are shifting in
ways that legal theory and doctrine have not yet fully absorbed. The
expanding role of multinational companies, the move toward the global
20. See Comity supra note 18, at 70-77 (addressing the implications of comity
and suggesting alternative legal approaches for managing private-international-law dis-
putes).
21. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) (defining transnational law).
22. M. KATZ & K. BREWSTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND
RELATIONS (1960).
23. D. VAGTS & H. STEINER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS xi (1968) (in-
troducing the theme of the book and noting its distinction for that written by Katz
and Brewster).
24. J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(1977).
25. Feminist theorists have shown that where the terms "public" and "private" are
invoked in domestic law, particularly family law, they are used to legitimate the
exercise of "private" power and to limit the intervention of "public" authority into the
"private" sphere. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of
the Public? Private Distinction, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 319 (1993) (discussing the
characterization of power as "private"). Privileging the exercise of private rights to
contract over public regulation is also a frequent characteristic of the operation of
private international law. See generally Comity, supra note 18, at 54-77 (discussing
the function of comity in U.S. courts); Isolation of Private International Law, supra
note 16, at 149-155 (introducing the separation of public and private international
law).
612 [VOL. 10: 2
HeinOnline -- 10 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 612 1994-1995
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
factory, the increased capacity of container vessels to move large vol-
umes of goods more rapidly, improved telecommunications facilitating
almost instantaneous capital movements that defy national controls and
the lessening of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade negotiated under
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and regional associations
like the European Community and the North American Free Trade
Agreement, all gave greater importance to the economic activities of
private entities and of parastatal enterprises.
The new movements' responses to the traditional canons of interna-
tional economic law encompass a number of jurisdictional movements
that have dominated U.S. legal education in the last two decades. These
would include at a minimum, critical legal studies, feminist theory, criti-
cal race theory, international relations theory, law and economics, law
and society, and public choice theory. The differences among these
jurisprudential strands are obvious and have been discussed at length
elsewhere. Broadly speaking, most theorists in public choice theory,
game or regime theory, and law and economics attempt to posit a value-
neutral system for understanding and applying legal norms. Conversely,
most theorists in critical legal studies, feminism, and law and society
would avoid making any claims of a value-neutral methodology. Indeed,
implicitly these theories are premised on the idea that legal analysis
cannot escape the trap of subjectivity. Whereas the first set of theories
assumes that objectivity and neutrality are necessary, desirable, and real-
izable features of legal analysis, the alternative theories reject both the
desirability and the possibility of objectivity or neutrality. Yet, these
theories share a common interest in introducing interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to legal analysis and represent a generational shift away from
descriptive doctrinal analysis and law reform toward social theory.
Thus, internationalists have been compelled by changes in the political
structure of the postwar period to respond to the traditional canons of
international law, while the foundations of our jurisprudence shift and
crack. At the same historical moment that the globalization of produc-
tion of goods and services has heightened interest in international eco-
nomic law, legal scholars are rethinking the fundamental categories and
doctrines. Sovereignty, the preoccupation of classical public international
law, has meant having the authority to control actors and activities with-
in the sovereign's own territory. Yet today, sovereigns cannot control
what their national actors do outside their territory, nor how those activ-
1995]
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ities directly affect their territory. From this perspective, the reach of the
state has contracted before the market. 6
It is particularly ironic that in the same historical moment that mil-
lions have achieved national self-determination in Eastern Europe and
the third world, they are finding that they cannot control economic
conditions at home without the participation of foreign creditors, inves-
tors and markets. "Self-determination" is being redefined to mean the
capacity to determine something other than one's own economic destiny.
What is left to the sovereign is the authority to police the social values
of its citizens-the reproductive rights of women, the place of racial,
ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, the education of children and the
role of churches. The rise of fundamentalism in both the West and the
East-what some have called a "culture war" in the United States-can
be seen as an admission that there is very little else left for the sover-
eign to manage other than the consciences of its nationals.
This symposium is intended to open up the discourse about the nature
and the relationship of the sovereign and the market. The papers collect-
ed in this volume resulted from a workshop organized by the Intema-
tional Economic Law Group of the American Society of International
Law on interdisciplinary approaches to international economic law. They
represent a sampling of the rich new literature in the field. They are
organized around four modalities for interpreting international economic
law: historiography, social theory, critical theory, and economic and
game theory. These different approaches to understanding the regulation
of the global market form a conversation about the nature of the enter-
prise. Should we be discussing the huge shifts in capital that occur in
electronic pulses, or should we focus on the redundant workers? Is inter-
national economic law about the state, or is it about non-state actors?
Are we moving toward a globalization of legal regimes, or is interna-
tional law being absorbed into the municipal law? Are international
economic forces intruding into state regulation, forcing state regulators
to compete for scarce capital in a race to the bottom?
The papers by Professors Nathaniel Berman and David Kennedy trace
the historical development of international economic institutions in this
century. Berman describes the evolution of Keynes' interpretation of
nationalism as initially incompatible with economic development and
26. Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, International Regulatory Competition and the Au-
tonomous Market Fallacy, I COLUM. J. EuR. L. (1995). I have argued there that the
market and the state are interrelated in complex ways that calls into question the
assumption of an autonomous market.
614 [VOL. 10:2
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later as a cultural agent for reconstruction. Berman uses John Maynard
Keynes' criticism of the Treaty of Versailles and its aftermath as a
paradigm for understanding the relationship of modem nationalism and
international economics. Berman characterizes this as a shift from the
modernist view of nationalism and internationalism in conflict, to a
postmodem view that transnational forces may be seen as allies of local
or national interests.
Professor Kennedy picks up the historical development of economic
institutions after the collapse of the League and the Second World War,
showing the shift from a style of idealistic thinking about public interna-
tional law and institutions which he characterizes as "metropolitan," to
the more pragmatic private-oriented thinking he calls "cosmopolitan."
The emblematic figure in this shift is Professor John Jackson, whose
prolific writings have had a long and enduring influence in the develop-
ment of international economic law and institutions. Employing a struc-
tural analysis of the text of Jackson's treatise, Kennedy sees Jackson as
a paradoxical figure whose modest descriptive approach to international
economic law often disguised his own efforts at pushing the envelope of
what could be done through cooperative efforts. Kennedy reveals a
persistent "cosmopolitan" idealism in Jackson's realist rhetoric.
Professor Jackson's foreword typifies that attitude, describing interna-
tional economic institutions as the "boilerroom" of global politics.
Jackson's ambitions for the development of international economic law
become more apparent when he describes the allocation of power among
sovereign states under the GATT and the WTO, as forming an interna-
tional constitution. Jackson's claim of a constitutionalism is itself a
significant step in the development of international economic institutions
and a recognition of the underlying challenge of international gover-
nance and accountability.
The second cluster of papers apply public choice and international
relations theories to international economic law and institutions.
Professor Anne Marie Slaughter describes the three principle schools
of international relations theory-realism, institutionalism, and liberal-
ism-and argues that regardless of political views, international relations
theory can be an effective analytical tool for understanding the interna-
tional economic system. Slaughter applies the liberal paradigm to the
development of the doctrine of extraterritoriality. The shift that Slaughter
identifies, from power relations to interest balancing, has the conse-
quence of reversing the presumption that all law is territorial. Her nor-
mative analysis leads to a presumption of extraterritoriality that favors
national regulatory policies. The liberal paradigm describes a network of
1995] 615
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liberal societies with criss-crossing interests, engaged in a web of eco-
nomic relationships that determine the legal relations of private and
public parties.
Professor Paul Stephan, III, explains how economic theory describing
the behavior of private individuals may be used to understand the out-
comes of legislative decisions. Professor Stephan shows how monopolis-
tic rent-seeking behavior by lawmakers may lead to inefficiency and
distort democratic representation. The ability of discrete interest groups
to control the public agenda, according to Stephan, explains the system-
atic under-investment in public goods. Stephan applies public choice
theory to shed new light on the exercise of executive power in intema-
tional trade relations, the imposition of currency controls, the continuing
tension between protecting the environment and lowering trade barriers,
and the preservation of national culture from foreign influence. As seen
by Stephan, both protectionism and free trade may be the consequences
of rent-seeking behavior.
Professors Saskia Sassen and Rosemary Coombe in the third cluster
of papers, employ social theory to understand global restructuring of
capital. Sassen examines how the globalization of production both dis-
perses economic activity beyond the reach of national regulatory au-
thorities and also results in an agglomeration of management in global
cities. She is concerned with filling the void of accountability and gov-
ernance left by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Her intellec-
tual strategy for realizing this project is to recover "place"; that is, to
identify the specific communities where globalization is occurring as
points at which to exercise regulatory control.
Like Professor Sassen, Professor Coombe is engaged in the project of
recovering place. Employing her training as an anthropologist, Coombe
focuses attention on a specific group of informal market actors by view-
ing through their eyes the ironies of commodifying symbolic goods like
copyrights. Paradoxically, Coombe shows that globalization can only be
understood locally in terms of specific communities and its effect on
their cultural and economic life.
Finally, Professors Anita Allen and Shelley Wright, using quite differ-
ent poststructural critiques, examine the relationship of individuals to the
market. Allen deconstructs the text of Shakespeare's "Merchant of Ven-
ice," to examine how culture contours economic relations. Allen de-
scribes how the market demands that we set aside our cultural antago-
nisms and prejudices to do business with the stranger. Allen illustrates
from the text that law operates contingently in the market, reflecting the
616 [VOL. 10:2
HeinOnline -- 10 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 616 1994-1995
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
prejudices of those who wield it, while justice itself is a measure of
market values.
Through a feminist lens, Professor Wright critiques the disparate im-
pact of international commerce on women. Wright challenges the ap-
pearance of formal equality in the market by exposing the realities of
substantive inequality that systematically operate against the claims of
women for property. Wright responds to the arguments of economic
efficiency that it is irrational not to invest in the well-being and educa-
tion of a work force. Wright views these market realities as a matter of
priorities, which the international system could reorder, if it had the will
to do so.
Drawing generalizations about this rich and complex collection of
papers is difficult. Most of these authors are self-consciously employing
interdisciplinary studies, while rejecting traditional legal categories of
public/private or national/international. Rather than focusing on the tradi-
tional subjects, like multinational enterprises, these writers are calling
attention to the externalities of globalization-the communities and indi-
viduals at the peripheries whose experiences are not usually reflected in
the traditional canons of international economic law. Yet, the papers in
this symposium do not present a uniform ideology or a manifesto or
even an agenda. Rather, they represent a first effort to challenge the
traditional categories and doctrines of intematilonal economic law and to
explore the subject with fresh insights. The science of complexity may
call into question our ideas about order and chaos and may lead social
theorists to the view that our ideas about order are socially constructed
and vary with perspective. Similarly, the heterogeneity of the new move-
ments in international law may lead us to the conclusion that there is no
single correct modality for viewing economic regulation.
1995] 617
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